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PEOPLE ANALYTICS AND THE REGULATION OF INFORMATION 
UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 
PAULINE T. KIM* AND ERIKA HANSON** 
INTRODUCTION 
People analytics—the use of big data and computer algorithms to make 
personnel decisions—has been drawing increasing public and scholarly 
scrutiny.1 Software is now available for screening applicants to identify the 
most promising candidates, or searching online profiles to find top prospects 
for recruitment.2 Algorithms claim to predict which workers will be most 
productive or which employees are most likely to leave their jobs.3 These tools 
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 1. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES, 51–53 (May 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/HF2G-F2A2]; Danielle Keats Citron 
& Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 
(Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclu 
sion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/H636-LGLS]; FRANK 
PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015); Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions 
for Big Data, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 666–68 (2012); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, 
Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. 
Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013); Pauline T. 
Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Alex 
Rosenblat, et al., Data & Civil Rights: Employment Primer, DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS CONFERENCE 
(Oct. 30, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541512 [http://perma.cc/5H 
C2-PP8U]; Matthew T. Bodie, et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769980 [http://per 
ma.cc/W6DX-GDV3]. 
 2. Josh Bersin, Big Data in Human Resources: Talent Analytics (People Analytics) Comes 
of Age, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbersin/2013/02/17/bigdata-in-
human-resources-talent-analytics-comes-of-age [http://perma.cc/FD3U-7UTJ]. 
 3. George Anders, Who Should You Hire? LinkedIn Says: Try Our Algorithm, FORBES 
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeanders/2013/04/10/who-should-you-hire-
linkedin-says-try-our-algorithm/#18ffec042506 [http://perma.cc/UWD8-5WNL]; Claire Cain 
Miller, Can an Algorithm Hire Better Than a Human?, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2015), 
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are built by collecting and analyzing vast amounts of data about individual 
characteristics and behaviors that go far beyond traditional factors like 
education and training.4 The datasets are subject to data mining, a process by 
which computers examine the data to uncover statistical patterns.5 Those 
patterns are then used to make predictions about future cases and to inform 
decision-making. 
As workplace use of data analytic tools expands, commenters are raising 
alarms about the potential unfairness of relying on them to make consequential 
employment decisions. Some concerns focus on the potential intrusiveness of 
the data gathering required to develop and use these tools.6 People analytics 
depend on the collection of large amounts of information, some of it highly 
personal. Efforts to harvest health-related data, or information about off-duty 
behavior and activities on social media potentially threaten employees’ 
personal privacy. Even relatively trivial bits of information—when aggregated 
with other data about an individual—can reveal highly sensitive personal 
information. For example, information recorded by electronic activity trackers 
and collected as part of employee wellness programs can be analyzed to reveal 
when an employee is pregnant or trying to conceive.7 
Other commenters charge that people analytic tools can be unfair if the 
data contains errors or mischaracterizations.8 Inaccurate information in 
individuals’ consumer records may cause them to unjustifiably lose out on 
employment opportunities. Employees have alleged that inaccuracies in reports 
about their criminal records or credit histories caused employers to deny them 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/26/upshot/can-an-algorithm-hire-better-than-a-human.html 
[http://perma.cc/L5GS-S4ET]; Steve Lohr, Big Data, Trying to Build Better Workers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/technology/big-data-trying-to-build-better-
workers.html [http://perma.cc/99CX-QZYV]. 
 4. Michael Fertik, Your Future Employer Is Watching You Online. You Should Be, Too, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 3, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/04/your-future-employer-is-watchi 
[http://perma.cc/38AG-Y66Y]; Jeanne Meister, 2014: The Year Social HR Matters, FORBES (Jan. 
6, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeannemeister/2014/01/06/2014-the-year-social-hr-matters 
/#4b005ef362dc [http://perma.cc/X64A-3URC]; Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-
you-at-work/354681/ [http://perma.cc/TV5U-ZVTP]; Ester Kaplan, The Spy Who Fired Me: The 
Human Costs of Workplace Monitoring, HARPER’S MAG., Mar. 2015, at 31–40. 
 5. Bart Custers, Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: Introduction and Overview, in 
DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3, 7 (Bart Custers, et al. eds., 
2013). 
 6. Rosenblat, et al., supra note 1; FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10. 
 7. Valentina Zarya, Employers Are Quietly Using Big Data to Track Employee 
Pregnancies, FORTUNE (Feb. 17, 2016, 5:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/02/17/castlight-preg 
nancy-data/ [http://perma.cc/XR26-RVR6]. 
 8. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 1; Bodie, et al., supra note 1; Rosenblat, supra note 1. 
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jobs.9 Similarly, when algorithms rely on error-ridden personal data, they may 
make inaccurate predictions that arbitrarily reduce individuals’ employment 
opportunities. Even when personal information is technically accurate, it can 
be presented in ways that are misleading. And algorithms may draw inferences 
or make predictions that are unjustified, resulting in the arbitrary denial of 
employment opportunities.10 
In addition, big data tools may produce discriminatory effects. Although 
workforce analytics may sometimes help to counter biased human judgments, 
data is not always objective or neutral. Scholars have documented numerous 
ways that reliance on algorithms can result in discrimination.11 Relatively 
trivial information, such as zip code or Facebook “likes,” may correlate closely 
with protected characteristics like race or gender, or reveal a person’s political 
or religious views.12 These types of data may operate as proxies, allowing a 
biased employer to hide its discriminatory intent behind a seemingly neutral 
data model. Even when no discrimination is intended, algorithms can produce 
discriminatory outcomes. If, for example, the underlying data reflects biased 
judgments about workers’ performance, an algorithm built using that data may 
simply reproduce that bias. In other cases, the data used to create the algorithm 
may not be representative of the workforce, resulting in a skewed model that 
systematically disadvantages groups of workers along the lines of race or other 
protected classification. 
In another article, one of us has explored how anti-discrimination law 
might limit the use of discriminatory algorithms in the workplace.13 Others 
have similarly considered whether or how existing laws that protect employee 
privacy or prohibit discrimination apply to people analytics.14 The purpose of 
this symposium contribution is to consider another source of regulation—one 
 
 9. Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Solutions, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 651, 666 (E.D. Mich. 
2014); Miller v. Johnson & Johnson Pharm., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
 10. Because data mining uncovers statistical relationships that may not be causal, relying on 
those correlations to make predictions about future cases may result in arbitrary treatment of 
individuals. See Kim, supra note 1. 
 11. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1; Toon Calders & Indre Zliobaite, Why 
Unbiased Computational Processes Can Lead to Discriminative Decision Procedures, in 
DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 5; Kim, supra note 1; 
Joshua A. Kroll, et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://pa 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2765268 [http://perma.cc/3FWZ-FA6Q]. 
 12. See, e.g., Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell & Thore Graepel, Private Traits and 
Attributes are Predictable From Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 5802 (2013) (showing that records of an individual’s Facebook 
Likes can be used to accurately predict personal characteristics such as race, gender and sexual 
orientation, religious and political views, and personality traits like intelligence). 
 13. Kim, supra note 1 (arguing how Title VII should be interpreted to address discriminatory 
algorithms at work). 
 14. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 1; Bodie, et al., supra note 1. 
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which is often overlooked. The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is not 
usually thought of as workplace regulation, and yet one of its purposes is to 
ensure that consumer information is used fairly when it informs employment 
decisions.15 The FCRA thus places some restrictions on how an individual’s 
personal information is communicated and imposes duties on employers. 
Because the FCRA focuses on regulating information flows, it might seem to 
be a promising avenue for preventing unfair uses of big data in the workplace. 
After all, people analytics requires lots of data about individuals, both to create 
the algorithms in the first place, and to use them to make predictions about 
particular individuals. Using these big data tools thus requires someone to 
collect the data, analyze it, and communicate findings to the employers who 
can use them to make personnel decisions—activities potentially regulated by 
the FCRA. 
This essay examines the protections established by the FCRA and how 
they apply to employment decisions. It then considers whether and to what 
extent those protections address concerns about invasions of privacy, 
unfairness and discrimination that have been raised in connection with people 
analytics. The FCRA establishes certain procedural requirements, and these 
can sometimes help individual workers challenge inaccurate information about 
them. However, although employers face significant liability risks if they 
disregard the statute’s requirements, the FCRA in fact does little to curb 
invasive data collection practices or to address the risks of discriminatory 
algorithms. Examining how the FCRA does and does not apply to people 
analytics reveals the limitations of a purely procedural approach. Given these 
limits, protecting employee privacy and preventing workplace discrimination 
will require looking to other models of regulation. 
I.  THE FCRA’S BASIC PROVISIONS 
Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 to regulate the credit reporting 
industry because of concerns about the fairness and accuracy of credit 
reports.16 The statute acknowledged the “vital role” that consumer information 
provided by consumer reporting agencies plays in eligibility determinations 
made by commercial entities like banks, insurance companies and employers.17 
At the same time, it recognized the need for “fairness, impartiality, and a 
respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.”18 Thus, the purpose of the FCRA 
was to require reporting agencies to “adopt reasonable procedures” to ensure 
that consumer information is used “in a manner which is fair and equitable to 
 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2012). 
 16. § 1681(b). 
 17. § 1681(a). 
 18. § 1681(a)(4). 
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the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and 
proper utilization of such information.”19 
The FCRA permits the release of consumer information only in service of 
a limited set of enumerated purposes, one of which is employment.20 The 
emphasis of the statute is on procedural protections. In order to protect 
consumers from inaccurate or unfair uses of their personal information, it relies 
heavily on mechanisms of disclosure and opportunities for challenging 
erroneous information. These procedural obligations are imposed on both 
companies that provide the information for these purposes—“consumer 
reporting agenc[ies]”—and entities like banks and employers that make use of 
the information.21 The statute provides a private cause of action, permitting 
aggrieved individuals to bring suit for violations of many of the statute’s 
requirements.22 Federal agencies also have an important role in enforcement.23 
Since the FCRA’s enactment, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been 
the primary agency in charge of interpretation, implementation, and 
enforcement of the FCRA.24 After the passage of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010,25 the FTC shares many of these responsibilities with 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), although it maintains its 
role as the primary enforcer of the statute.26 
The provisions of the FCRA apply when a “consumer reporting agency” 
furnishes a “consumer report.”27 A company is a “consumer reporting agency” 
under the law if it “regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of 
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on 
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”28 
The term “consumer reporting agency” is limited to entities that are engaged in 
the commerce of assembling or evaluating and distributing consumer 
information.29 Excluded from the definition are entities that assemble and 
 
 19. § 1681(b). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2012). 
 21. Id. 
 22. §§ 1681n, o. However, violations of § 1681m cannot be pursued through a private right 
of action. § 1681m(h)(8). 
 23. § 1681s. 
 24. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT 
REPORTING ACT: AN FTC STAFF REPORT WITH SUMMARY OF INTERPRETATIONS 1 (2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/40-years-experience-fair-credit-report 
ing-act-ftc-staff-report-summary-interpretations/110720fcrareport.pdf [http://perma.cc/GEN2-
7GCH] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 26. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 1–2. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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evaluate information for non-commercial uses as well as entities that assemble 
information about the entity’s own interactions with its customers.30 
A “consumer report” is defined as “any written, oral, or other 
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on 
a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or 
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving 
as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for . . . employment 
purposes . . .”31 Courts have generally found that information constitutes a 
consumer report under the law if it satisfies three elements that track the 
language of the FCRA: 1) the information was communicated by the consumer 
reporting agency; 2) it bears on the “consumer’s credit worthiness, character, 
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living”; and 3) it was 
“used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for one of the 
enumerated purposes.”32 
When employers request information from third parties about applicants or 
employees for purposes of making hiring, promotion, retention or other 
employment decisions, the procured information may be a “consumer report” 
subject to the FCRA’s requirements. For example, employment background 
checks that include information about credit, employment and salary history, 
or criminal records are consumer reports when they are obtained from a 
consumer reporting agency. 
Both the consumer reporting agencies that provide information and the 
businesses that use the consumer reports to make decisions are subject to 
certain requirements under the FCRA.33 For the consumer reporting agency, 
these requirements include permitting consumers to review information in their 
files without charge,34 investigating alleged inaccuracies,35 and providing 
 
 30. See, e.g., Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children’s Services, 355 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973) (holding that information collected and used by social service institutions such as child 
adoption agencies is not subject to obligations and liabilities provided by the FCRA which was 
intended to deal with the commercial uses of consumer reports); Tierney v. Advocate Health and 
Hospitals Corp., 797 F.3d 449, 451–54 (7th Cir. 2015) (dismissing the suit of a medical network’s 
patients whose information was stolen on the grounds that the medical network did not assemble 
patient information for monetary fees and the information was based only on the network’s 
experiences with its own patients which is not subject to the requirements of the FCRA). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012). 
 32. See, e.g., Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC, 49 F. Supp. 3d 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing 
cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals). 
 33. The Consumer Credit Reform Act of 1996 amended the FCRA to expand its reach 
beyond these entities, imposing obligations on the businesses that supply information to credit 
reporting agencies or “furnishers” of information as well. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3444 (1996). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. §1681g(a)(1). 
 35. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 
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information to consumers about their rights.36 Consumer reporting agencies 
may only provide reports for one of the allowable purposes listed in the 
statute.37 One of those allowed purposes is employment; however, before 
providing a report for employment purposes, the credit reporting agency must 
obtain certification from the employer that it will comply with its duties under 
the FCRA.38 In addition, the consumer reporting agency may have to notify 
customers when it has released certain information that may adversely affect 
their ability to obtain employment.39 
Businesses that use consumer reports for one of the enumerated purposes 
are also required to comply with the FCRA.40 In particular, employers that use 
consumer reports in making personnel decisions are obligated to comply with 
certain statutory requirements at three different times: prior to accessing a 
consumer report, before rejecting an applicant or taking adverse action against 
an employee, and after taking the adverse action. 
Before accessing a consumer report, an employer must provide a clear, 
conspicuous, and stand-alone disclosure that a consumer report may be 
obtained for employment purposes;41 obtain written authorization from the 
applicant or employee for procurement of the report;42 and certify to the 
consumer reporting agency its compliance with the requirements of the statute 
and that it will not violate any equal employment opportunity law.43 If an 
employer intends to take an adverse action based on information in the report, 
it is required to provide notice before rejecting a job application, reassigning or 
terminating an employee, denying a promotion, or taking any other adverse 
employment action.44 The employer must also provide a copy of the consumer 
report relied upon and a description of the individual’s rights under the 
FCRA.45 These requirements afford the affected individual an opportunity to 
review the report and attempt to correct any mistakes. 
After taking adverse action based upon information in the consumer report, 
the employer must provide notice of the adverse action to the individual; 
provide the name, address, and phone number of the consumer reporting 
company that supplied the report; include a statement that the company that 
supplied the report did not make the decision to take the adverse action and 
 
 36. § 1681g(c). 
 37. § 1681b(a)(3). 
 38. § 1681b(b)(1). 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a). 
 40. § 1681b. 
 41. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 42. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 43. § 1681b(b)(1). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 
 45. Id. For more details on the information that must be included in the description of rights, 
see § 1681g(c)(1). 
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cannot provide specific reasons for it; and provide a notice of the individual’s 
rights to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the report and to receive an 
additional copy of the report if requested within sixty days.46 Furthermore, if 
an employer uses “investigative reports”—defined as reports based on personal 
interviews concerning an individual’s character, general reputation, personal 
characteristics, and lifestyle—such investigations must meet additional 
obligations under the FCRA.47 
The FCRA creates a private right of action for violation of its 
requirements. In cases of willful failure to comply, a consumer may recover 
actual damages or statutory damages between $100 and $1000.48 A court may 
also allow punitive damages and attorneys’ fees in such a case.49 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted “willful” violations to include violations committed in 
“reckless disregard” of FCRA obligations.50 In cases of negligent 
noncompliance, consumers may recover actual damages and attorneys’ fees. 
Actual damages can include economic damages such as lost wages and non-
economic damages such as monetary damages for emotional distress and 
humiliation.51 A notable exception is that no private right of action is available 
when an employer fails to make the disclosures that are required after taking 
an adverse action based on a consumer report.52 
Because the FCRA’s procedural requirements are highly technical, a 
careless employer might easily run afoul of them—for example, by failing to 
put the pre-check disclosure “in a document that consists solely of the 
disclosure.”53 In recent years, employers have faced a rising number of FCRA 
claims. These cases are typically brought as class actions and allege that the 
employer failed to provide proper disclosure before procuring a consumer 
report, as required by section 1681b(b)(2), or failed to provide information 
before taking an adverse action based on the information, as required by 
section 1681b(b)(3).54 Because many employers use standard forms and 
 
 46. § 1681m(a). 
 47. §§ 1681d, 1681a(e). 
 48. § 1681n. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). 
 51. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson & Johnson Pharm., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1296 (M.D. 
Fla. 2015); Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Solutions, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 651, 666 (E.D. Mich. 
2014). 
 52. Congress eliminated this private right of action under the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, providing for administrative rulemaking and 
remedies instead. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8) (2012); see also Perry v. First Nat’l Bank, 459 F.3d 
816, 823 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8) applies to all causes of action 
under § 1681m). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 54. See Pitt v. Kmart Corp., No. 3:11-cv-00697 (E.D. Va. May 24, 2013); Kmart Agrees to 
Pay $3 Million to Settle Claims It Failed to Provide FCRA Notices, DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 12, 
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processes for all applicants, these cases lend themselves to class treatment. For 
large employers dealing with thousands of applicants, damages for procedural 
violations can quickly add up. For example, recent cases against Home Depot, 
Publix Markets, and Wells Fargo have settled for $1.8 million, $6.8 million, 
and $12 million respectively.55 
As described above, the FCRA relies heavily on procedural protections, 
requiring consumer reporting agencies and users of credit reports to provide 
notice when reports are provided or relied upon, and to disclose their contents 
upon request. The statute contains very few substantive limits on the types of 
information that can be collected or reported. The main restriction in this 
regard is that certain types of obsolete information are required to be excluded 
from a consumer report. For example, a consumer bankruptcy more than ten 
years old or a tax lien paid more than seven years earlier should be excluded 
unless certain exceptions apply.56 In addition, the statute imposes a general 
duty on consumer reporting agencies to exercise reasonable care through 
adequate procedures to ensure the information they provide is accurate. Thus, 
the statute states that a consumer reporting agency “shall follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” about an 
individual.57 
Case law indicates that the requirement of “reasonable procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy” does not impose strict liability for 
inaccurate reports, but it does require a consumer reporting agency to take 





3D%3D [http://perma.cc/2Z4Z-LBGT]; Williams v. Amazon.com, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 497, 497 
(N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 55. Fernandez v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-00648 (C.D. Calif. April 24, 2016); 
Allison Grande, Home Depot Pens Deal to End FCRA Class Action, LAW360 (Apr. 21, 2015, 
10:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/645948/home-depot-pens-deal-to-end-fcra-class-
action [http://perma.cc/42MS-CKGX]; Lisa Nagele, Final OK Sought for $6.8 Million Settlement 




-ZGXM]; Manuel v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:14-CV-238 (E.D. Va. 2015); Thomas Ahearn, 
Wells Fargo Settles Background Check Lawsuit for $12 Million, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 
RESOURCES (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2016/01/20/wells-fargo-settles-
background-check-lawsuit-for-12-million/ [http://perma.cc/X9AK-WLZJ]. 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)-(b) (2012). 
 57.  § 1681e(b). 
 58. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass’n., 682 F.2d 509, 512–13 (5th Cir. 
1982) (per curiam). 
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For example, the court in Thompson found that a consumer reporting agency 
failed to exercise reasonable care when it relied on a computer program to 
automatically capture information and include it in a consumer’s record 
without adequate checks to confirm that the information was actually about 
that individual.59 Similarly, in Bryant, the court held that a consumer reporting 
agency does not comply with the FCRA simply by reporting accurately what it 
was told by creditors.60 Once a consumer disputes the accuracy of information 
contained in a report, the agency cannot continue to include that information 
unless it takes reasonable steps to investigate whether the information is in fact 
true or not.61 
Thus, the FCRA does not guarantee that all information assembled and 
reported about consumers will be accurate. Instead, it provides certain 
procedural protections that can alert a consumer about the existence of errors 
and provide an opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information. 
II.  THE FRCA AND PEOPLE ANALYTICS 
When the FCRA was enacted in 1970, its main focus was on the “Big 
Three” nationwide credit reporting bureaus—Equifax, Experian, and 
TransUnion—and other agencies that operated similarly.62 As different types 
of entities have gotten into the business of collecting and sharing personal 
information, uncertainty has arisen as to exactly which ones fall within the 
definition of a consumer reporting agency such that the requirements of the 
FCRA apply to them and the businesses that use their services. This Part 
reviews recent developments and considers whether the statute’s provisions are 
likely to address concerns about invasions of privacy, unfairness and 
discrimination that have been raised about people analytics. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the FCRA will only come 
into play when an employer relies on information from a third party. To the 
extent that an employer collects and analyzes information about its own 
employees, it is not covered by the statute.63 The FCRA places no limits on an 
employer’s ability to gather data about its employees, whether through direct 
inquiry, surveillance or other forms of computer monitoring. People analytics, 
however, often rely on information collected outside the workplace and sold to 
companies to use for employment purposes. As discussed below, these types of 
transactions are likely subject to regulation under the FCRA. Even when an 
employer collects data about its own workers, the FCRA may still apply if it 
 
 59. Id. at 513. 
 60. Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (2012); Thompson, 682 F.2d at 513; Bryant, 689 F.2d at 78; see 
also Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 707 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 62. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 38–39. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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contracts with an outside company to analyze the data and evaluate individuals 
for employment purposes.64 
A growing number of companies are serving as data brokers, harvesting or 
purchasing large datasets and aggregating them in order to produce detailed 
profiles of consumers. These profiles are then provided to interested parties for 
a fee. For example, LexisNexis developed a product know as Accurint which 
provides detailed information for over 200 million individuals.65 The reports 
include information such as 
where the consumer resides, the consumer’s age, social security number, date 
of birth, economic profile data regarding the consumer’s home and 
neighboring properties, whether the consumer has filed for bankruptcy, has any 
liens or judgments, public records, UCC filings, professional licenses, accident 
history, recreational permits, and general information about the consumer’s 
assets and property.66 
LexisNexis has sold millions of these reports each year for use in locating 
people and their assets and verifying information about particular 
individuals.67 Another company, Spokeo, aggregates publicly available 
information from phone books, real estate listings, government records, and 
social networking sites in order to create detailed profiles about individuals, 
including assessments of their wealth, economic health and personal 
characteristics.68 Individuals have sued these companies, alleging that the 
reports contain inaccuracies, harming their reputations and limiting their 
economic opportunities. Central to these lawsuits is the question whether these 
new types of businesses are “consumer reporting agencies” covered by the 
FCRA.69 
The federal agencies responsible for enforcing the FCRA have concluded 
that a variety of entities beyond the original big three credit reporting bureaus 
are covered by the statute. The CFPB’s list of consumer reporting agencies, 
released in 2016, includes nearly forty-five companies beyond the Big Three 
that are considered consumer reporting agencies by the Bureau.70 The Federal 
Trade Commission has similarly interpreted the meaning of a “consumer 
 
 64. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 15. 
 65. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 66. Adams v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., No. 08-4708, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47123, at *1 (D.N.J. May 12, 2010). 
 67. Berry v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-754, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 124415, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2014), aff’d, Schulman, 807 F.3d at 619. 
 68. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546 (2016). 
 69. See, e.g., Schulman, 807 F.3d at 605. 
 70. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, LIST OF CONSUMER REPORTING 
AGENCIES 1–3 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201604_cfpb_list-of-consumer-report 
ing-companies.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KBD-FXHA]. 
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reporting agency” to reach new products.71 An illustrative example is the 
FTC’s settlement with mobile app company Filiquarian Publishing.72 
Filiquarian advertised that its mobile app could conduct a “quick criminal 
background check for convictions” and that users could conduct searches on 
potential employees.73 The FTC determined that Filiquarian was a consumer 
reporting agency within the meaning of the law and thus, it and companies 
using its app, were obligated to comply with the FCRA.74 According to the 
FTC, the presence of a disclaimer on the company’s website stating that 
“background screening reports weren’t to be considered screening products for 
insurance, employment, loans, and credit applications” and that the company 
was not “FCRA-compliant” did not absolve the company of responsibility for 
complying with the statute.75 
Private litigants have also pressed the issue of coverage under the FCRA. 
Although the FTC issued an Opinion Letter in 2008 stating that the Accurint 
reports are not “credit reports” under the FCRA, LexisNexis’s practices were 
challenged in several private lawsuits.76 In Adams v. LexisNexis Risk & 
Information Analytics Group, Inc.,77 the plaintiff alleged that she was not 
allowed to view information contained in reports about her and that when she 
reported errors, LexisNexis refused to investigate or correct the disputed 
information in violation of the FCRA. Although LexisNexis argued that it was 
not required to comply with the statute, the district court denied the 
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.78 Instead, it found that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to raise a factual question whether 
 
 71. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 108–110. 
 72. Consent Agreement at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Filiquarian Publ’g, LLC et al., No. C-
4401 (Apr. 30, 2013). 
 73. Tony Rodriguez & Jessica Lyon, Background Screening Reports and the FCRA: Just 
Saying You’re Not a Consumer Reporting Agency Isn’t Enough, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 10, 
2013, 2:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2013/01/background-
screening-reports-fcra-just-saying-youre-not [http://perma.cc/3AA3-RVZ5]. 
 74. Complaint at 3, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Filiquarian Publ’g, LLC, No. C-4401 (Apr. 30, 
2013). 
 75. Rodriguez & Lyon, supra note 73. 
 76. Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., 
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (July 29, 2008). 
 77. Civil No. 08-4708, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47123, at *2–5 (D. N.J. May 12, 2010). 
 78. Id. at *28–29. 
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LexisNexis was a consumer reporting agency79 and whether Accurint was a 
consumer report such that the requirements of the FCRA applied.80 
In Berry v. LexisNexis Risk & Information Analytics Group, Inc.,81 the 
plaintiffs similarly alleged that LexisNexis failed to comply with the FCRA 
when selling its Accurint reports. The case was brought as a class action, 
which ultimately settled.82 The agreement called for the defendant to divide its 
Accurint report into two new products. One product will contain 
comprehensive information and be treated as a consumer report, such that 
LexisNexis must comply with all of the relevant FCRA requirements. The 
other, “Contact & Locate,” will contain only limited information about 
individuals83 and will not be treated as subject to the FCRA. Nevertheless, the 
defendant agreed to voluntarily provide some FCRA-like protections in 
connection with the product, such as the ability for a consumer to obtain free 
copies of their report once per year and to submit statements disputing 
information. After a hearing, the district court approved the settlement, and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.84 Although no definitive rulings were issued 
on the core legal issue—whether LexisNexis is a consumer reporting agency 
under the FCRA—the courts’ approval of the settlement agreement85 suggests 
 
 79. Id. The court applied the following four-part test: an entity is a “consumer reporting 
agency” if it: (1) exchanges consumer information for compensation; (2) regularly engages in the 
practice of assembling consumer credit or similar information; (3) for the purpose of furnishing a 
consumer report to third parties; and (4) acts in interstate commerce to prepare or furnish the 
report. Id. at *14. 
 80. Id. at *28–29. The case subsequently settled. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 605 (4th 
Cir. 2015). 
 81. No. 3:11-CV-754, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124415, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2014), 
aff’d, Schulman, 807 F.3d at 600. 
 82. Schulman, 807 F.3d at 606. The district court certified two settlement classes. One class, 
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provided monetary compensation for the 
approximately 31,000 individuals who tried unsuccessfully to get copies of their reports or to 
dispute information in them. That aspect of the settlement was not challenged on appeal. The 
second settlement class was certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 
provided injunctive relief in the form of LexisNexis’ changed practices. Under the settlement, 
members of the (b)(2) class also waived their right to statutory and punitive damages, although 
they retained the right to seek actual damages on an individual basis. This (b)(2) settlement class 
was challenged in the district court and on appeal by objectors who sought to retain the right to 
seek statutory damages. Id. at 606–07. 
 83. The parties agreed that the “Contact & Locate” product would not include any of the 
“seven characteristic” information that makes a communication a “consumer report.” Id. at 607. 
The seven specific consumer characteristics as defined in the statute are “a consumer’s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, 
or mode of living.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012). 
 84. Schulman, 807 F.3d at 607, 619. 
 85. According to the district court, the injunction implements a “substantial, nationwide 
program that . . . will result in a significant shift” in industry practices. LexisNexis Risk & Info. 
Analytics Grp., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124415, at *10. 
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that data brokers like LexisNexis are likely to be held to the requirements of 
the statute. 
The FCRA’s expanding coverage of consumer reporting agencies results in 
part because new types of products may fall within the statute’s definition of a 
“consumer report.” Communication about non-traditional information beyond 
employment and credit histories will qualify as a consumer report when it is 
used to assess an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit 
capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living.”86 In advice offered to businesses, the FTC explained that it believes 
the FCRA’s rules apply to reports derived from information on social media.87 
Thus, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Spokeo alleging that it 
failed to comply with the FCRA when it sold detailed personal profiles 
assembled from sources including social media.88 The suit eventually settled 
with a consent decree requiring Spokeo to pay $800,000 in civil penalties.89 
In addition, software that automatically assesses consumers’ credit 
worthiness may also be a “consumer report.” In Zabriskie v. Fannie Mae,90 
plaintiffs alleged that Fannie Mae was acting as a consumer reporting agency 
when it developed and licensed a software program called Desktop 
Underwriter for use by mortgage lenders. Lenders enter the personal 
information of a prospective borrower into the program and the Desktop 
Underwriter automatically combines that information with data from the Big 
Three credit reporting agencies and generates a report indicating whether the 
loan would be eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae. The plaintiffs alleged that 
the software erroneously reported a foreclosure on their home, and they sued, 
arguing that Fannie Mae had violated the FCRA by failing to follow 
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy of its reports. 
In considering whether Fannie Mae was covered by the FCRA, the district 
court focused on two critical elements of the definition of a consumer reporting 
agency.91 It considered whether Fannie Mae “assembl[es] or evaluat[es]” 
 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). 
 87. Lesley Fair, The Fair Credit Reporting Act & Social Media: What Businesses Should 
Know, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (June 23, 2011, 10:23 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2011/06/fair-credit-reporting-act-social-media-what-businesses 
[http://perma.cc/ 6UV2-DR4U]. 
 88. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
 89. Consent Decree at 4, United States v. Spokeo, No. 2:12-cv-05001 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 
2012). 
 90. No. CV-13-02260, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26124, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2016). 
 91. The court laid out the five elements of the statutory definition of a consumer reporting 
agency as follows: “(1) the company must be paid for its work or be working on a ‘cooperative 
nonprofit basis,’ (2) it must be in the business of (that is to say, ‘regularly’) (3) ‘assembling or 
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers’ (4) ‘for the purpose 
of furnishing consumer reports to third parties,’ and (5) must use interstate commerce to achieve 
these aims.” Id. at *7–8. There was no dispute as the first, second, and fifth elements. Id. at *8. 
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consumer credit information, and if so, “whether it does so ‘for the purpose of 
furnishing consumer reports to third parties.’”92 The court concluded that 
Fannie Mae satisfied both elements.93 On the first question, the court held that 
because Fannie Mae had created the software based on its proprietary 
algorithms, it was “evaluating” consumer credit information when it licensed 
the software to lenders.94 Even though the lender entered the data into the 
program, the lender could not have generated the report or its conclusions 
manually. Rather, Fannie Mae, was “evaluating” the consumer information 
through its proprietary algorithm incorporated into the software.95 On the 
second question, the court concluded that because the Desktop Underwriter 
communicated new information about prospective borrowers, its purpose was 
to furnish a consumer report to third parties—the lenders.96 Finding the 
elements satisfied, the court in Zabriskie concluded that Fannie Mae was a 
consumer reporting agency for purposes of the FCRA, although other courts 
have reached a different conclusion.97 
What are the implications of these developments for people analytics? It 
might seem at first glance that FCRA offers a significant avenue for regulating 
the use of unfair or discriminatory algorithms in the workplace. When big data 
tools are used to make employment decisions, they appear to satisfy the 
definition of a consumer report, because they communicate information 
bearing on “character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living” that is used to determine eligibility for employment.98 Thus, data 
brokers like LexisNexis that provide highly detailed personal profiles are likely 
to be considered consumer reporting agencies subject to the FCRA. And, like 
the defendant in Zabriskie, vendors who sell software programs that screen or 
evaluate applicants and employees may also be considered consumer reporting 
agencies. Even if the employer enters information about a particular individual 
into the software and makes the ultimate decision whether to hire or not, the 
vendor of the software is arguably “evaluating” the applicant and 
communicating that assessment to the employer through the algorithm it 
created. As a result, companies selling these types of software are likely to be 
regulated as consumer reporting agencies. 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *14–15. 
 94. Id. at *11–12. 
 95. Zabriskie, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26124, at *10–11. 
 96. Id. at *13–15. 
 97. Id. at *15; contra McCalmont v. Fannie Mae, No. 2:13-cv-2107, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2012). 
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However, even if the FCRA is interpreted expansively in these ways, it 
will do little to protect employees from privacy intrusions or unfair or 
discriminatory uses of their data. As explained above, the FCRA’s 
requirements are largely procedural. So long as a data broker or employer 
complies scrupulously with the disclosure requirements, the FCRA imposes 
very few substantive limits on the types of information that can be collected or 
disclosed. The procedural requirements may help individuals learn what 
information is reported about them, and to challenge any inaccuracies, but they 
do little to restrict the vast data gathering that occurs or to protect against the 
sharing of highly personal or sensitive information. Even when the procedural 
requirements have been violated, individuals may not be able to recover under 
the FCRA. The Supreme Court recently suggested as much in Spokeo v. 
Robbins, noting that procedural violation of the FCRA may not result in any 
actual harm, such that the individual consumer would lack standing to sue.99 
Nor does the FCRA provide any real substantive limits on how data 
collected about an individual is used. If an employer relies on inaccurate 
information to deny someone a job, but it did not violate any of the procedural 
requirements, the FCRA provides no relief. In cases involving procedural 
violations where applicants have been denied jobs based on erroneous 
information, the amounts recovered in damages are usually quite small.100 And 
nothing in the statute prevents employers from relying on data profiles in ways 
that are irrational or unfair. Thus, the FCRA offers little recourse if an 
employer relies on biased algorithms. Although the statute requires an 
employer to certify that “information from the consumer report will not be 
used in violation of any applicable federal or state equal employment 
opportunity law or regulation,” it does not appear to offer any mechanism for 
challenging employer use of credit reports in ways that might be 
discriminatory.101 Instead, enforcement of anti-discrimination norms will 
depend upon how equal employment opportunity laws are interpreted and 
applied.102 
CONCLUSION 
When the Fair Credit Reporting Act was passed in 1970, Congress 
recognized that the personal information collected by credit agencies was 
 
 99. 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016). 
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 102. See Kim, supra note 1, at 59–60. 
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playing a significant role in determining access to economic opportunities, 
including employment. The statute sought to address concerns about the 
accuracy and fairness of consumer data by imposing procedural requirements 
on the entities that sold or made use of this information. The expectation was 
that by providing individuals with notice and disclosures about their consumer 
reports, they would be able to protect themselves by correcting erroneous 
information. 
Since the FCRA was passed, the volume of personal information available 
has increased exponentially. This vast and growing amount of data combined 
with improved computing has given rise to “people analytics,” raising anew 
questions of whether and how business entities should be permitted to collect 
and use highly personal information for employment purposes. While the 
FCRA might appear to offer a model for regulating information flows, 
experience suggests that it imposes significant costs on consumer reporting 
agencies and employers, but is ill equipped to limit invasive data collection 
practices or to curb the use of unfair or discriminatory algorithms. Whether or 
not it met its original purpose, the FCRA’s procedural model is clearly inapt in 
the era of big data. Addressing concerns about invasive, unfair or 
discriminatory uses of people analytics will require policy makers to grapple 
directly with questions about when and to what extent substantive regulation is 
warranted. 
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